APSA Impact Report 2016

Assessment of the Impact of Interventions by the AU and RECs in 2016 in the frame of APSA Trends and core findings

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Part 1: Conflict trends in Africa in 2016 and 2017

Violent conflicts in 2016 (subnational level)

Source: The graph was adopted from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) and subsequently adapted; Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2016): Conflict Barometer 2016, Heidelberg, p.11
Violent conflicts in 2017 (subnational level)

Source: The graph was adopted from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) and subsequently adapted; Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2017): Conflict Barometer 2017, Heidelberg, p.11
Intensity of conflicts in Africa in 2016

- A sharp rise in level 3 conflicts in 2016
- ‘Reversal’ in 2017: decrease in violent conflict (-8) and uptick in wars (+3)
Conflict items in Africa in 2016
Resources - a conflict item in 62.5% of all highly violent conflicts

Conflict items in Africa in 2016

- Territory: 3.7%
- Secession: 5.6%
- Autonomy: 9.3%
- System/Ideology: 19.8%
- National Power: 22.2%
- Subnational: 19.1%
- Resources: 17.3%
- Other: 1.9%
Conflict items in Africa in 2017

Resources - a conflict item in 58% of all highly violent conflicts
Part 2: The APSA Impact Report 2016 – Main results

• Points of departure:
  • Annual *Heidelberg Conflict Barometer* (focus on conflicts defined as violent = 3 & >, on scale 1-5)
  • Focus on AU & REC interventions
Mapping of AU/REC engagement

- Mapping and rating (1-3) of all interventions in a conflict timeline
- Distinguishing between AU and RECs
- Distinguishing instruments, between:
  - Diplomacy
  - Mediation
  - Peace Support Operation
  - PCRD (to a certain extent)
- Harmonization of rating, to allow for comparison across conflicts => ‘Indicative table of Interventions’
Findings on mapping of interventions

- 28 out of 67 conflicts (42%) were addressed by APSA (47% in 2015)
- AU/RECs were more likely to intervene in high-intensity conflicts (level 4/5)
- One level 2 conflict (Republic of Congo) included Violent conflicts (HIIK 3-5) with and without interventions
• Mapping exercise in 28 conflicts showed that in 57% of conflicts, a combination of instruments was used:

Use of single and combined APSA instruments by AU/RECs in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single instrument*: 12 conflicts</th>
<th>Two instruments*: 9 conflicts</th>
<th>Three instruments*: 7 conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Only Diplomacy (11) or Only Mediation (1)</td>
<td>*Either Diplomacy and Mediation (6) or Diplomacy and Peace Support Operations (3)</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Mediation and Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next step: assessment of impact

➢ Effectiveness/Successfulness
➢ Quality
Analysis of effectiveness of AU/REC engagement

• Based on a 3 step process:
  1. *Was the intervention swift in responding to escalation and de-escalation points?*
  2. *Were intended results achieved?*
  3. *Did the intervention de-escalate the conflict? (e.g., dialogue led to a peace agreement)*

• Judgment categories:
  • ‘Overall successful’, ‘Partly’, ‘Too early to tell’, ‘Rather unsuccessful’ + justification (via peer exchange)
• Findings: Overall judgment for interventions in 28 conflicts:

- Overall successful: 10
- Partly successful: 12
- Rather unsuccessful: 6

• 78% of interventions (where there were interventions) were successful or partly successful
Effectiveness of interventions in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Interventions</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>PSOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall successful</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly successful</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather unsuccessful</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too early to tell</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Bar chart](chart.png)
Development of effectiveness of interventions 2013-2016
Analysis of quality of AU/REC engagement

- Based on a 3 step process:
  1. Relative significance of AU/REC role in comparison to other (international) actors
  2. Appropriateness of the degree of engagement of AU/REC in proportion to the intensity of the conflict
  3. Use of synergies between AU and RECs and other international actors in the framework of interventions

- Judgment categories:
  - ‘Overall High’, ‘medium’ or ‘Mostly low quality’ + justification (via peer exchange)
• Findings: Overall judgment on quality of interventions for 28 conflicts:

- Overall high quality: 14
- Medium quality: 10
- Overall low quality: 4

- 86% of interventions were medium or high quality
### Quality of interventions in 2016

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<tr>
<td><strong>Quality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall high quality</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium quality</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly low quality</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too early to tell</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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![Bar chart showing the quality of interventions in 2016](image)
Development of quality of interventions 2013-2016
Separate analysis on peace agreements

**Findings:** 27 signed between July 2015-June 2016 > 15 mediated by AU/RECs (56%) (50% in 2015) > 7 (47%) held for one year or more
Part 3: Conclusions and Recommendations

APSA Framework

+ AU/RECs have become effective, indispensable actors in maintaining peace and security in Africa
  - 86% of all interventions were deemed of high or medium quality.
  - 78% of interventions were evaluated to be successful or partly successful.

+ No other continental framework provides comparably strong mandates & instruments for conflict transformation
  - Principles of sovereignty and non-interference, and political interests continue to constitute barriers to early response

→ Anticipated closer UN-AU partnership is crucial for increasing effectiveness of interventions
→ Use of mandate to intervene should be determined by need rather than political interests
Conclusions and Recommendations

Use of APSA tools

+ Adaptive and innovative use of APSA instruments led to positive outcomes in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau
  – A lack of progress was noted in longstanding interventions such as Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia

→ The research shows that the combination and sequencing of diplomacy, mediation and PSOs is likely to contribute to the higher effectiveness of interventions
Conclusions and Recommendations

Conflict Items

- Elections, natural resources (as addressed by Tana Forum 2017) and social exclusion constitute potential drivers of conflict.

+ The AU has shown strong commitment to focus on structural conflict prevention as underlined by the „Continental Conflict Prevention Framework“ and initiatives outlined in the „Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020“

→ There is a strong need for greater inclusion of civil society, especially youth and women in order to have a comprehensive approach towards tackling peace and security issues (e.g. need for stronger implementation of UNSCR 1325 on regional and institutional level, in addition to current strong focus on NAPs)
Conclusions and Recommendations

Regional integration

- Varying capacities of RECs/RMs to undertake effective interventions leads to unevenness in regional performance “

→ *Strong regional integration, evenness of performance and a clear division of roles and responsibilities is crucial for effectiveness of the APSA*
Conclusions and Recommendations

Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and PCRD

+ Development of Maputo Work Plan and the subsequent verification of pledged ASF capabilities contribute to the effectiveness of the ASF
+ Ongoing revision of ASF doctrine, compliance framework and code of conduct regulations are important to address current shortcomings
+ Dedicated efforts by AU and RECs to operationalize PCRD framework have been noted

→ Stronger focus on PCRD is crucial as most conflicts arise in post-conflict countries
Conclusions and Recommendations

AU reform processes

+ Kagame Report underlines ongoing attempts for structural reforms to streamline AU in terms of core competences, priority areas, realignment of institutions and improvement of its accountability
+ Attempts at financial reform in line with the Kaberuka report promise more stable funding and increased ownership
+ Efforts to reform and operationalize the Peace Fund show commitment to create more sustainable APSA interventions

→ Financial stability and independence is crucial for increased ownership, and the effectiveness of the APSA
Questions?

Thank you!