ROUNDTABLE: “DIASPORA AND PEACE: WHAT ROLE FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION?“

Background Paper
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<td>CVO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internal displaced persons</td>
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<td>INC</td>
<td>Irish National Caucus</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>LTRC</td>
<td>Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<td>M&amp;D</td>
<td>Migration and development</td>
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<td>MIDA</td>
<td>Migration for Development in Africa</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>TOKTEN</td>
<td>Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Networks</td>
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<td>TRQN</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

The economic potential of diaspora groups for the development of their countries of origin is well known. Contributions of the diaspora and of returnees to their countries of origin can extend beyond the economic sphere, however. Diaspora actors can contribute to peacebuilding in the country of origin or, conversely, can also be perceived as “peace-wreckers”, fuelling the conflict through different channels.

While there seems no doubt that “diasporas have increasingly become significant players in the international political arena” (Vertovec, 2005, p. 1), there is a growing debate on the nature and impact of diaspora engagement in conflict-settings. Financial contributions of diasporas can help to generate employment and provide greater economic stability in conflict affected countries (Nielsen & Riddle, 2010). These contributions may inadvertently increase inequality within communities and create new economic elites, however, which in turn can contribute to revitalisation or intensification of the conflict (Koser, 2007). Political engagement can raise international awareness and contribute to rehabilitation of political institutions, thus promoting conflict resolution. Conversely, such engagement could also support political fragmentation and may produce new political elites (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Projects promoting civil society, community development, and humanitarian aid can support reconstruction and reconciliation and help those affected by the conflict to receive protection, but such contributions may be selective or a cover for political objectives (Brinkerhoff, 2011). The motivations diaspora members have and the contributions they make can be diverse and can vary according to the different phases of a conflict (conflict emergence, continuation, escalation, termination and post-conflict reconstruction). The influence of such intervention can thus be positive (in the sense of peace building), negative (conflict-fuelling) or neutral; influences can also be political, military, economic or socio-cultural in nature.

These examples highlight that the actions diaspora groups take can have both intended and unintended, as well as negative and positive, impacts on conflict and the origin country’s development. Moreover, different groups and individuals within the same diaspora can differ in terms of approaches, interests, and objectives in their contributions to the homeland, leading to opposing aims and strategies of involvement. Given the context-specific nature of diaspora engagement, it is essential to understand
the interests, aspirations, institutions, and objectives of diaspora groups as well as the structural factors by which they are shaped to ensure responsible engagement with the diaspora of development actors.

Diasporas are becoming increasingly-recognised partners in mainstream development cooperation. At the same time, the level of politicisation is a key concern when cooperating with diasporas in conflict settings. A potential lack of neutrality, impartiality, and independence of diasporas and their actions, can risk insufficient adherence to humanitarian principles, which provide the fundamental foundations for peacebuilding, development cooperation, and humanitarian action. In the context of fragile- and conflict-affected states, and given the potential ambiguity of diaspora engagement in such settings, development cooperation needs to be aware of how the diaspora can be best facilitated to contribute to peace. At the same time, supporting peace promotion through diaspora actors can be an interesting field of activity for mainstream development actors – respecting certain conditions and a strong do-no-harm approach.

The following report serves as a background paper for the Roundtable on “Diaspora and Peace: What Role for Development Cooperation?”. This paper provides an overview of contemporary research on diaspora and their roles in peace-building in (post-)conflict societies. The report starts with a discussion on how key concepts—such as diaspora, development, and peace—are understood and operationalised, by outlining the main definitions and discussing their analytical challenges. The third chapter is devoted to the review of the current state of knowledge regarding diaspora contributions to peace from different conflict and country contexts, drawing on literature from diverse sources, such as academic articles, policy documents, programme documents, and other sources of information. In addition, this sections aims to shed light on the different factors influencing diaspora contributions to peace, by focussing on diaspora group dynamics and the transnational political opportunity structure. Finally, the concluding section discusses important implications for how development cooperation can interact with the diaspora in shaping joint interventions in countries experiencing or recovering from conflict, highlighting both the potential advantages as well as risks of diaspora collaboration. Moreover, concrete recommendations that development cooperation
agents can follow to enhance the chances of fostering efficient partnerships with the diaspora will be provided.

2. KEY CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS

Over the past decades, the tone and content of research on the relationship between diaspora and peace(-building processes) have subtly shifted in line with evolving dialogues and discourses about migration in general, the diaspora in particular, and the migration and development nexus as a focus of policy and practise. The potential ways in which the diaspora can contribute to peace, both as an outcome and a process, depend in part on how key concepts—such as diaspora, development, and peace—are understood and operationalised.

2.1 Diaspora Concepts & Practice

Nowadays the term diaspora is applied in an almost inflationary way and is used synonymously with immigrant population, displaced communities, ethnic minorities, or (Brubaker, 2005; Dufoix & Waldinger, 2008; Vertovec, 2007) transnational social formations. The heterogeneity of immigrant populations and the stretching of the concept have become an analytical challenge that makes defining “diaspora” very difficult (Brubaker, 2005; Dufoix & Waldinger, 2008; Vertovec, 2007).

While traditionally, diasporas were perceived as a result of dispersion due to a cataclysmic event that led to involuntary migration, traumatising the group as a whole and creating a central experience of victimhood, the term now refers to different conceptualisations of migrants (forced and/or voluntary) and focuses on the relationship to the country of origin, the country of residence and to other members of their ethnic or origin-country groups (Cohen, 2008). In general, definitions all include the following three common features: 1) dispersion (implies movement) 2) boundary-
maintenance (group identity), and 3) link with homeland (Brubaker, 2005). The following quote captures these dimensions well:

“Diasporas are formed by the forcible or voluntary dispersion of people to a number of countries. They constitute a diaspora if they continue to evince a common concern for their ‘homeland’ (sometimes an imagined homeland) and come to share a common fate with their own people, wherever they happen to be” (Cohen & Kennedy, 2013, p. 39).

As migration patterns have changed given globalisation and social transformations, the conceptualisation of diaspora has shifted in turn. According to Vertovec (2007) more people are now moving from more places, through more places, to more places, leading to a diversity of immigrant backgrounds and experiences. In addition, there is also differentiation within immigrant population of the same origin, due to multiple waves and patterns of migration, ranging from forced migrants to those seeking labour, education and family unification. As a result, members of diasporas are facing different social, economic and political circumstances and conditions in the destination country that, along with different trajectories of displacement, shape identities, political orientations and their capacity of engagement.

Given this heterogeneity, there has been increasing criticism challenging the assumption that diasporas are natural results of migration and homogeneous dispersed populations with historically fixed identities, values and practices (Vertovec, 2005). Influenced by space, place and time, ethic identities vary even within the same origin (Anderson, 2001). In her critique Anthias (1998) therefore argues that the traditional concept of diaspora fails to move beyond the primordialist approach to race and ethnicity. Recognising identities as fluid, multidimensional, personalised complex social constructions, they are shaped not just by ethnicity, but also by gender, social class, generation and lived experiences (Anthias, 1998; Howard, 2000; Weerakkody, 2006). With hybrid and multiple identities and changing borders over time, homeland orientation and relation can be subject of constant transformation and change. Soysal (2000) criticises that traditional concepts see diasporas as an extension of the nation-state model, implicating that there exist a conformity between territory, culture and identity. Yet, in particular since the post-war era, economic, political and cultural
boundaries are shaped and changed constantly, resulting in new claims of membership, belonging and identity.

Hence, newer concepts are moving beyond essentialist conceptions of identity, culture and belonging, and focus on the process of social construction that influence the formation of a diaspora, emphasise the broader transnational context in which the formation takes place and see diasporas as effects rather than simply causes (Adamson, 2008). Moreover, as Lyons & Mandaville (2010) argue not every migrant who feels connected to the homeland and share a common identity with others should be considered as part of a diaspora, but only those who are “mobilised to engage in homeland political process” (p.126). In the discourse of transnationalism scholars emphasise that migrants, being connected to several places commonly engage in exchanges and interactions across borders and are involved in multiple societies at once.

Importantly, diaspora groups and their sources of network identity should not be considered just along national, ethnic and religious lines, but also based on gender, professional networks and political affiliation. Thus, diaspora groups and their respective institutions are seldom unified and homogenous; there is a need to understand the different aspirations and institutions of diaspora groups as well as the underlying factors such as class, professional, ethnic and gendered hierarchies that create fragmentation, power relations and competition among diaspora groups (Baser, 2014; Koinova, 2011; Walton, 2014).

While traditionally diasporas were either perceived as peace makers or peace wreckers, newer conceptualisations allow to move beyond this dichotomy by highlighting the various roles different diaspora groups can play in conflict. Strategies of diaspora groups should not be perceived as fixed, but rather as situated in the context and process of mobilisation, being therefore dynamic in space and time (Mavroudi, 2007).

Table 1 provides a comparison of the main arguments of the two conceptual approaches and their implications for the analysis of diaspora engagement in conflict settings.

**Table 1: Comparison of the two approaches**

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<th>Traditional</th>
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If diasporas are defined as multi-layered, heterogeneous, and dynamic social formations, resulting from and actively engaged in transnational mobilisation, the challenge is to clearly identify the members of diaspora groups. Even though, those who are actively engaged both in the country of origin and destination might be more visible than non-active migrants, this does not mean that they should be perceived as representative of the immigrant population (or the society) of an origin country as a whole. Moreover, recognising that collective identity is contested not just along ethnic, national, and religious lines but also based on gender, social class, and political affiliation, there is a need to understand the different institutions, organisations and groups, and the internal power dynamics among them and their relations to local actors in the origin country. Given this heterogeneity the main challenge for policy makers is to identify and select “legitimate” diaspora groups with which to engage, taking into account the potential conflict and power-dynamics among these groups.

2.2 Migration & Development
The relationship between the diaspora and peace is inextricably linked to the larger relationship between migration and development. The stages of establishing and sustaining peace—peace enforcement, keeping, building, and consolidation (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005)—are often tied to other development processes. Such development processes can include the rehabilitation of civil institutions, the demobilisation of conflict agents, and the reconstruction of community resources and institutions. As potential contributors to these (and other) development processes, the diaspora have gained growing attention from more traditional development actors, particularly within the context of development cooperation.

*Development cooperation* can be understood as the transfer of public assistance in the form of grants or loans; assistance can be provided bilaterally, from government-to-government, or through non-government organisations or multilateral agencies. Over the past decades, development cooperation has placed greater emphasis on the poverty-reduction role of assistance, which reinforces the notion that *development is a process*, which is multidimensional and rooted in economic, scientific, civic, and social transformations.

As concepts of development and modalities of development cooperation have changed, migrants at large (and the diaspora as a sometimes unique but generally interchangeable group) have been gradually brought into the development discourse as possible development actors. The recent (re)conscription of migrants as development actors follows the course of what de Haas (2010) describes as a pendulum-like swing between optimism and pessimism about the developmental impacts of migration. Whereas the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by optimistic scholarly debate about migration and development, the following two decades were marked by scepticism and pessimism about the linkages between the two concepts. In the 1990s, the discourse again shifted toward optimism, with remittances as a new development paradigm (Kapur, 2004) cementing the potential development advantages of migration into the minds of policy makers.

The evolving debate about migration and development may reflect larger changes in the way development is defined and executed. Both Bakewell (2008) and Faist (2008) noted that in the 1970s and 1980s, migration was seen as a response to development failure or failures of governance that undermined human security and well-being, which
lead to migration and development policies that emphasised control of mobility. Over the past decades, however, unique spaces have been created for diaspora groups to act as development actors, particularly as community and civil society have become more prominent in development theory. Faist proposed that “community” is one of the three principles of social order (the state and the market being the other two); as a principle of social order, “communities constitute the cement that integrates the members of concrete communities into values of trust, reciprocity and solidarity, bounded by rights and obligations of members towards each other” (Faist, 2008, p. 23). In the mid-1990s, as the role of the state as a mechanism for creating social order began to shrink, “community” gained recognition as a compensatory mechanism. Individuals and the communities they formed were therefore “empowered” to contribute to and (in some cases) lead development, with the diaspora emerging as one such powerful collective. Sinatti and Horst (2014), however, note that the mobilisation of the diaspora occurs within a very specific understanding of “development”. Development may be viewed as tantamount to development assistance and as a process undertaken by professionals. When the diaspora is included in this process, it is generally as an accompaniment to “professionals” within the development industry; rather than enhancing development outcomes in the country of origin, the diaspora is often seen as a beneficiary of inclusion on the development process whose capacities and skills are built by their engagement in the development industry.

The evolution of the migration and development discourse is important to understand, as it provides the necessary context for understanding the types of development activities the diaspora can contribute to. In the past, many of the contributions migrants have made to development have not been considered as “development” but rather as “charity” or “philanthropy”, at least until such activities were incorporated into the “planned” and “rational” development processes led by development cooperation agencies (Sinatti & Horst, 2014). In practise the contributions the diaspora makes to development may by the same when they are made independently of “professional” development assistance or when they are organised within the scope of development assistance. The separation between diaspora contributions as “charity/philanthropy” and “development” assistance suggests that the perceived scope and legitimacy of diaspora contributions to development may be shaped by the relationship between the diaspora and policy bodies.
The discourse around migration, diaspora, and development—and the role of migrants as agents of development—has given rise to some specific migration and development (M&D) policy. The seminal 2002 work on the “migration and development nexus” by Nyberg-Sørenson, van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen highlighted the complex interactions between migration and development that policy could address, including poverty as a driver of migration, migrant remittances as sources of aid, and migrant knowledge as a development resource. Since the publication of this report, many governments have elaborated policies that address a particular aspect of the migration-development nexus. In an evaluation of the M&D policies of the European Union and 11 European states, Keijzer and colleagues (2015) observe that M&D policy generally involves the integration of migration into development policies and/or, less frequently, the integration of development into migration policies, often by emphasising migrants as a development resource.

There are three particularly-relevant types of policies that countries have adopted to draw migrants at large into the development process: those relating to remittance attraction and investment, (temporary) return, and diaspora engagement. Remittance policies often focus on one of two areas: 1) securing remittance channels from use by money launderers and financiers of terrorism, or 2) encouraging remittances flows by encouraging competition and transparency among remittance service providers and creating investment vehicles for remittances (e.g., remittance matching schemes like “Pare 1+1” in Moldova, diaspora bonds). Return policies tend to focus on the creation of programmes that facilitate the temporary or virtual return of migrants to their country of origin, often to take part in knowledge transfer or capacity building within specific organisations or sectors. Diaspora engagement policies are diverse and generally try to build a formalised relationship between the diaspora and the state; over half of all UN countries have specific institutions (e.g., ministries, inter-ministerial committees, advisory councils) related to the diaspora, and many more countries have one or more policies to foster state engagement with the diaspora (Gamlen, 2014).

Many policies that try to engage migrants in the development process focus on the economic contributions that migrants or diaspora members can make, but Faist (2008) proposed that migrants can also contribute through social remittances (norms, ideas, and values) and through temporary labour migration, which may facilitate the transfer
of a migrant’s financial assets and the circularity of human capital. Brinkerhoff (2012) also highlighted that while the diaspora can make financial contributions through remittances, diaspora philanthropy, and homeland economic investment, they can also contribute skills and values. Values can be transferred through participation in political processes, including lobbying, in both countries of origin and residence. These contributions can be made with or without government endorsement, but Brinkerhoff suggests that governments should contribute to a facilitating environment for these contributions and that “governments who choose to partner with their diasporas for development may find themselves negotiating... much as they must do to access donor resources” (Brinkerhoff, 2012, p. 92). The phrasing suggests another subtle change in discourse, with diaspora members and organisation described as partners who are actively courted by governments or other actors in development cooperation who want to make use of diaspora resources.

It should be noted that migration and development policies need not only focus on migrants as a development resource; some policies identify migrants as threats to development given their potential to disrupt social solidarity and security. As noted by Hyndman (2012) the ‘securitisation of migration’ since the terrorist attacks in New York in September, 2001 has increasingly identified migrants as vectors of risk and insecurity. The perception of migrants as agents of insecurity may also be heightened by the public identification of diaspora members with organisations or actors engaged in homeland conflicts. A prime example of this is the way the Tamil diaspora was perceived as a threat to peace in Sri Lanka (and their host countries) via the public support of some diaspora members for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or Tamil Tigers (LTTE).

To understand the potential ways in which the diaspora can contribute to peace processes in conflict- and post-conflict countries, it is essential to understand concepts related not only to development but also to conflict and peace. The following section identifies key contemporary conflict trends and identifies how the role of the diaspora has involved in shaping conflicts.
2.3  **Conflict & Peace (-Building)**

Given this review's focus on the role of the diaspora in contributing to peace in conflict-affected countries, it is necessary to better explain how conflict and peace are conceptualised. Conflict should be understood not only as violence or hostility but as the result of an incompatibility between different actors with differing interests relating to resources and goals (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005). Peace can be defined through this conceptualisation of conflict, as the establishment of connections and forms of collaboration between potentially conflictual parties that ensure disagreements do not result in structural incompatibilities.

In 2014, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded 40 armed conflicts in 27 locations, from which 26 were categorised as intrastate conflicts, one as interstate conflict and 13 as internationalised conflicts. Although the number of conflicts peaked in the 1990s, conflicts in 2014 are at the highest number since 1999. While in the period before 1945 conflicts occurred mainly between nation states, the 21st century is characterised by intrastate conflicts with civil wars as the dominant form of organised violence, accompanied with an increasing number of internationalised armed conflicts (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015).

Contemporary intrastate conflicts or civil wars are often characterised by competition for power and control within territories around religious, ethnic, and cultural identities (Demmers, 2007). However, ethnic or religious conflicts can be a result of political power struggles due to more fundamental causes such as economic inequalities, political discrimination or human rights violations. Hence, grievance as a central source of conflict can be based on several factors such as ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and denial of social rights or economic inequality (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2011). As Brubaker (2006) argues, rather than treating ethnicity, race and nation as essentialist groups or entities, it might be more fruitful to talk about “practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, 

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1 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program provides the following definitions:
Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states; internationalised intrastate armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups, with intervention from other states in the form of troops; intrastate armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups.
organisational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events” (p.38). This also means that analysis should deal with ethnitisation (or other collective identities) as a relational, dynamic, political, social, cultural and psychological process. While ethnic identities can be resources that leaders draw on for political mobilisation, it is nevertheless important to understand the broader structures of a society, in which violence is rooted (Fearon & Laitin, 2000).

Moreover, research emphasises the “deterritorialisation” of conflicts due to transnational ethnic, political and economic linkages that span actors, events and resources beyond national boundaries (Gleditsch, 2007). Protection of ethnic kin could lead to foreign intervention in order to support separatist movements or government change in the conflict-affected country. In addition, rebel groups located in neighbouring countries can contribute to a spread and externalisation of the conflict across borders. Finally, civil wars could create increased tension and create political instability due to spill over effects created by refugees imposing social and economic burden (Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz, 2008). When it comes to the wider diaspora, lobbying of diaspora groups could lead to foreign intervention and disputes between different groups may increase the risk of extension of conflict dynamics to residence countries (Baser, 2015). Hence, even though members of diaspora reside geographically outside the state, they are identity-wise perceived both internally and externally as part of the homeland.

In that sense, diaspora groups can be perceived as significant transnational sources for financial and political support for different activities that both support and constrain conflict. There might be a feeling of obligation, guilt and grievance as well as a desire for power that inspire new or renewed interest of members of diasporas to shape the politics of the country of origin. Saideman, Jenne and Cunningham (2011) argue that diaspora mobilisation in conflict should be analysed based on cost and benefit calculations. They see the benefits of supporting homeland kin as a way to preserve the diaspora identity. The cost of diaspora engagement is in general quite low, since members of diaspora do not necessarily have to bear the direct consequences of their action.

Further, it is argued that diasporas are more likely to become politically involved when kin in the homeland are in danger, as this could heighten identification (Koinova, 2011;
Saideman et al., 2011). Findings show that developments in the country of origin might trigger identity-based response from diaspora groups, highlighting the transnational dimension of conflict and movements. For instance, Wohl, King and Taylor (2014) found that politicised collective identity (PCI) increases the support for political protest (peaceful or violent) among diaspora group members. When PCI is connected to high collective angst—a perceived existential group threat in the country of origin—support for violent action was more likely. On the other hand, the combination of a politicised collective identity with low collective angst predicted support for peaceful political protest. Similarly, Koinova (2013) revealed that high levels of violence in the country of origin lead to radicalisation of diaspora groups, while low levels of violence was related to moderate engagement. Whereas politicised collective identities are often a main driver for members of diasporas to take collective action, the level of politicisation is also a key concern when cooperating with diasporas in conflict settings. A potential lack of neutrality, impartiality, and independence of diaspora actions, can therefore risk insufficient adherence to humanitarian principles, which provide the fundamental foundations for peacebuilding, development cooperation, and humanitarian action (Horst, 2013; Svoboda & Pantuliano, 2015).

In sum, developments in the country of origin might trigger identity-based response from diaspora groups, which highlights the transnational dimension of contemporary conflicts. Yet, religious, ethnic, and cultural identities should not be seen as causes of conflicts but rather as resources leaders can draw on for political mobilisation. The analysis of diaspora engagement in conflict settings should therefore not be limited to dynamics along ethnic, religious or cultural lines but also requires a sound understanding of the conflict, actors, and the broader structures of the society in which grievances and violence are rooted. The following section provides a detailed overview of diaspora contributions to peace from different conflict and country contexts. In addition, the section sheds light on the different factors that influence these contributions, by focussing on diaspora group dynamics and the transnational political opportunity structure.
3 DIASPORA CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE

3.1 Diaspora Activities

This section reviews the state of knowledge regarding diaspora contributions to peace from different conflict and country contexts. In contrast to many previous reviews that consolidate the literature according to the type of contributions diaspora members and organisations can make (e.g., financial remittances, social remittances, return), this review is organised according the domain or sector to which diasporas contribute (e.g., peace processes and mechanisms, civil/political rehabilitation, infrastructure development). This organisational structure has several advantages. First, by organising the review according to the sector or area of activity, it is easier to identify the unique contributions the diaspora can make in different domains of development. Second, this structure can assist development cooperation actors in identifying areas of interventions where cooperation with the diaspora would be particularly beneficial. Third, such a structure does not require arbitrary categorisation of different forms of diaspora contributions, as the distinction between different forms of assistance (such as financial aid or material aid) is not always clear or relevant in a conflict or post-conflict setting.

This section reviews literature from different sources, including academic articles, policy documents, programme documents, and other sources of information on diaspora contributions to peace. Several caveats apply to this review that reflect the conceptual ambiguities inherent to the field. First, this review discusses possible ways in which the diaspora can contribute to peace, as the impact of diaspora contributions can generally not be determined given lack of data and evaluation on diaspora contributions. Second, the diaspora contributions reviewed here are assumed to contribute to ‘peace’ based on the information available, but this masks the uncertainty that often accompanies studies of diaspora engagement in conflict situations. In lieu of evaluations on the immediate and long-term impacts of diaspora contributions to conflict and post-conflict environments, it is difficult to determine if particular activities actually contribute to peace. Evaluations of diaspora contributions to conflict/post-
conflict settings often fixate on whether the diaspora acts as “peace-makers or peace-breakers”, which often entails normative judgement on behalf of the author about how different kinds of contributions translate into on-the-ground impacts. Such a judgement relies on several assumptions: 1) that a diaspora member is able to completely control how a contribution is spent on the recipient side, 2) that there are no unintended consequences of a contribution, and 3) that there is only one (linear) pathway to peace. Many assessments of diasporas as “peace makers or breakers” review the types of contributions a diaspora member makes from the sending side without assessing how those contributions are actually used; in principle, a diaspora member who sends remittances, for example, for a specific peaceable cause does not know if such money is instead invested on perpetuating conflict. As remittances are fungible, it is exceptionally difficult to show exactly what goods or services they have been used to purchase. An additional complication is that contributions that are in themselves benign or even peaceable can have unintended negative consequences. For instance, remittances that are received by a household in a conflict area may ensure that the household can sustain itself, which will allow them to remain in the area; this in turn may increase the pool of people a rebel force can draw conscripts from, which can prolong a conflict (as was suggested among Tamils in Sri Lanka; Fair, 2007). Finally, peace can be achieved through different ends, both violent and non-violent. It would be difficult to determine if a contribution that can accelerate conflict (e.g., the purchase of arms) would actually lead to further violence, would facilitate self-defence, or would accelerate the pace of conflict and bring earlier stability. To help avoid this conceptual uncertainty, the contributions of diaspora to peace are discussed where possible in reference to the conflict cycle and specific stages of peace-building (e.g., peace keeping, peace enforcement, conflict management, peace building, peace consolidation).

This review is organised according to the specific sectors or types of activities the diaspora may contribute to that enhance peace efforts. Given this structure, literature is excluded that does not explain specific areas in which diaspora contributions are invested. Much of the literature on diasporas in conflict settings, and on the wider potential contributions of diasporas to development, discusses how diasporas can use their human capital accumulated abroad to enhance development efforts; how their human capital is put to use is seldom mentioned. This review only includes literature
that specifically identifies and explores what the diaspora has contributed to peace/development in (post-)conflict environments.

3.1.1 Creation of or Contributions to Peace-Building Mechanisms

Despite a growing body of literature on the potential peace-enforcing role of diasporas in conflict and post-conflict settings, much of the literature instead documents either the contributions of diaspora to conflict perpetuation/enhancement or, alternately, on the role of diasporas in development initiatives. There are some documented instances in which the diaspora can directly shape conflict de-escalation, peace-building, and peace consolidation processes, however, through support of peace negotiations and transitional justice mechanisms.

In a review of the role of diasporas in conflict societies, Brinkerhoff (2011) noted that diasporas from countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Burundi, Nepal, Somalia, and Sudan all substantially shaped peace negotiations and agendas. Their contributions included identifying, communicating with, and encouraging conflictual parties to engage with international meditators; supporting implementation of peace agreements, including by directly mediating between warring parties; encouraging host-country governments to act as mediators or to support negotiations; advising on the context of the conflict and the relevant actors, and; suggesting features to be included in peace agreements (Brinkerhoff, 2011). As one specific example, the diaspora from different clans and sub-clans in Somalia were found to encourage their clan leaders to attend peace conferences and accept the compromises offered by opposing clans (Hammond et al., 2011). The Sri Lankan diaspora played a similarly instrumental role in pushing forward the 2002/3 peace negotiations, where “functional elites” among the Tamil diaspora in the United Kingdom, India, and Switzerland helped connect Sri Lankan political actors to the international political community, which in turn shaped the negotiation agenda. Members of the Sri Lankan diaspora were also consulted for their expertise in the diplomatic negotiation process, particularly related to economic development in affected communities (Zunzer, 2004).
The diaspora can also directly support the peace process by providing instrumental funding for peace conferences and other events that bring together delegates from warring parties or clans. In Somalia, for instance, the diaspora redirected significant financial resources to peace conferences and mediation events to reduce both intra- and inter-clan conflicts in Puntland and Galmudug in the post-2001 period. The diaspora also used remittances to fund *diya* payments, compensations for killings that help ease tensions between clans. In Puntland, the diaspora’s role in negotiations led to *diya* payment rising, with the “cost” of killing a man involving a payment of US $10,000, 100 camels, the cost of the gun used to commit the murder, burial expenses, and compensation of 40 million Somalian shillings to the families of the deceased. Such a rise on the compensations were used to discourage killings, as even families receiving remittances would be unable to provide such compensation (Hammond et al., 2011).

Once open conflict declines, transitional justice mechanisms can help bolster peace efforts, which diaspora members can substantially contribute to. Transitional justice measures, such as truth and reconciliation processes that encourage public disclosure of past crimes without the threat of retribution, can help encourage trust among divided societal groups. The diaspora can be important actors in such exercises, as they could both have been perpetrators of conflicts (as was the case among many members of the US-based Liberian diaspora) or the victims of conflict whose diasporic existence was created by conflict. Haider (2014), in a review of the role of the diaspora in transitional justice schemes, noted that a number of countries have actively consulted refugees, IDPs, and members of the diaspora about their transitional justice strategies. Kenyan refugees who had been displaced to Uganda following the 2007 election violence were consulted by the Kenyan Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission for input on how they could be engaged in transitional justice mechanism. The Zimbabwean diaspora in Europe was similarly approached by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, as were Iraqis in the US who were asked to contribute to the Iraqi Special Tribunal (Haider, 2014). An exceptional case of the participation of the diaspora in transitional justice processes was the participation of the Liberian diaspora in the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (LTRC), which was the only such commission of 41 established since 1973 that mandated inclusion of the diaspora in the reconciliation process (Antwi-Boateng, 2012a). In some countries, the diaspora played a more active role in encouraging the state to pursue transitional justice measures. The Haitian
diaspora, for example, pushed the state to create a truth commission for Haiti; the diaspora formulated a proposal that outlined the activities the commission should pursue and then lobbied for the proposal to be implemented (Quinn, 2009). Such activities not only demonstrate the commitment of the diaspora to the reconciliation process but can help enforce norms of solidarity by promoting acknowledgement and acceptance of past crimes.

Another means of transitional justice—the application of universal jurisdiction laws—has also engaged global diasporas in peace-building processes. Diaspora groups have actively pursued trials of home-state perpetrators of crimes abroad under universal jurisdiction laws, which enables prosecution for serious violations of human rights outside of the country where such violations occurred when the justice system in the home state is unwilling or unable to do so. The Argentinian, Cambodian, Chilean, and Rwandan diasporas all petitioned and lobbied for their host states, particularly France and Belgium, to arrest and try former members of state regimes accused of human rights abuses in the host country (Mey, 2008). The active pursuit of justice by the diaspora demonstrates that the diaspora can play an important role in supporting formalised post-conflict justice mechanisms, some of which may not be feasible without the instrumental support of members of the home country residing abroad.

The diaspora can also contribute to structural prevention of future conflicts through creating consultative mechanisms by which minority groups can be represented on central political level. Muslim members of the Ethiopian diaspora, for instance, formed a delegation that travelled to Ethiopia in 2007 to address concerns about the marginalisation of Muslims within Ethiopia with the federal government. The nine-member delegation, which included members from North America, Europe, and the Middle East, surveyed both members of the diaspora and members of the Muslim population remaining in Ethiopia about what issues were most pertinent to address with the government. Using language that strongly emphasised the human rights dimension of the inclusion of Muslims in Ethiopian society, the delegation discussed several key issues (among others) with high-ranking members of the Ethiopian government, including the prime minister. Discussion points included the need for more complete implementation of constitutional rights to citizenship and equality for Ethiopian Muslims, maintenance of secularism enshrined in the constitution, the right to
organisation and political inclusion of Muslim groups, and the need for a more balanced and responsible mass media (Feyissa, 2012). This example suggests that the diaspora can play a strong role in encouraging political and religious pluralism in a way that does not undermine but rather encourages greater integration between conflicting identity groups, which can help prevent future conflicts.

3.1.2 Civil & Political Institutions & Processes

One area of close overlap between peace and development relates to the creation and rehabilitation of civil and political institutions, many of which may have been absent prior to and during a conflict or may have been badly undermined by a conflict. The diaspora can engage directly in (post-)conflict reconstruction through activities that contribute to civil/political structures and their rehabilitation. Such activities can include participation in the drafting and ratification of political documents, engagement in political parties and elections, and support of civil society groups.

During state-building and consolidation processes, the diaspora can contribute to legislation and political documents that establish the character and trajectory of a state’s political future. The Eritrean diaspora, for instance, was encouraged to contribute to the drafting of the referendum for independence (and to vote for it) in 1993; following independence, the diaspora further contributed to the drafting and eventual ratification of the constitution of the new state (Koser, 2007).

The diaspora can also participate very directly in the rehabilitation of political institutions by running for election or accepting unelected roles in the government. Many examples of political leaders pulled from the diaspora during or following conflict abound, including Mohandas Gandhi (India), Hamid Karzai (Afghanistan), and Mikheil Saakashvili (Georgia). In Somalia, a significant share of leaders of state institutions in 2011 were former members of the diaspora; despite being less than 10 percent of the total Somali population, at least a third of all Somali regional governments (and up to two-thirds in some regions) were comprised of diaspora members. These former diaspora members filled roles as heads of state, members of parliament, members of cabinets, and other high-level bureaucrats (Ismail, 2011). A similar scenario occurred in
Iraq, where over half of the ministers in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2013 were former diaspora members from Europe or the US (Kadhum, 2014). In Afghanistan, three-quarters of the 30-member interim cabinet administration led by Hamid Karzai were former diaspora members, some of whom had participated in the political negotiations in Bonn that led to the formation of the interim government (Jazayery, 2003).

While the inclusion of the diaspora in high-level political positions does not necessarily ensure the adoption of a peace-building agenda, politicians from the diaspora may be more pre-disposed to support governance changes that align with international norms, which often encourage peace. In Somalia, for instance, Ismail (2011) found the political leaders from the diaspora were perceived as being more likely to support informed political debate through seminars and other information-sharing events, were more willing to reach out to local communities to promote peace and reconciliation, and made greater efforts to mobilise actors both in- and outside Somalia to support peace-building agendas than did non-diaspora politicians.

The diaspora can further shape a country’s political agenda, both during and following conflict, through participation in elections. Voting provisions are determined by a state and are largely outside of the diaspora’s scope of influence; in some instances, however, the diaspora has actively lobbied home states for the right to vote in home elections. While unsuccessful in securing the right to vote in general elections, the Nigerian diaspora has petitioned the government for extraterritorial voting rights and has used the issue of voting as a key point in testing the Nigerian government’s commitment to diaspora engagement (Binaisa, 2013). The Irish diaspora has similarly pressured the government since the early-1990s to extend voting rights to citizens residing abroad to no avail, which has been a source of tension between the diaspora and the state (Gray, 2013). Other diasporas have been more successful in lobbying their home states for political enfranchisements rights. After years of significant pressures from the diaspora, Mexico granted non-resident nationals the right to vote in 2005 (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2015). Many states now give possibilities for citizens residing abroad to participate in elections according to three general models. In the first model, citizens who permanently reside abroad have the right to vote in elections, but they must return to the territory of the state to cast their vote. In the second model, citizens who permanently reside abroad have the right to vote in elections and may cast their vote
outside of the territory of the home country. In the third model, citizens residing permanently abroad may vote, and their votes are cast and counted extra-territorially and used to elect special diaspora representatives. As of 2013, 13 countries had special representation for the diaspora population, which entitles diaspora members to designated and exclusive representatives of their interests (Collyer, 2014). In some cases the diaspora vote can have decisive impact on local elections. The presidential elections in Cape Verde in 2006 and Romania in 2009, for instance, were both determined by the diaspora vote, which overturned the domestic majority of the challengers (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2015). The diaspora can also support a greater diversity of political parties. The Kurdish diaspora in Finland and Sweden were involved before the 2009 legislative elections in supporting the development of an oppositional political party through meetings, associations, and internet-based discussion groups. The resulting political party (the Change List) was constructed to tackle issues such as perceived undemocratic practises and corruption in existing governance structures, and it received 25 percent of the Kurdish vote in the elections (Khayati, 2012). While voting is not inherently peaceful or conflictual in nature, the diaspora may apply the norms and standards acquired abroad in their voting decisions, which may lead to favouring of candidates that support conciliatory agendas.

Members of the diaspora may also play a role in strengthening the legitimacy of elections by helping resolve post-election disputes. In Liberia, Antwi-Boateng (2012b) noted that members of the American-based Liberian diaspora helped curtail post-election violence after the contested 2005 presidential run-off elections. One particular member of the diaspora convinced the candidate who had lost the run-off election not to dispute the results as a way to avoid increasing post-war tensions that could inspire further conflict.

Another important way in which the diaspora can support post-conflict peace is through support of a diverse and inclusive civil society, including by contributing to civil society organisations (CSOs) that encourage community development and collaboration. In some instances the diaspora can be instrumental in starting and sustaining CSOs that have a strong focus on community development during and after conflict. Members of the Kurdish diaspora in the UK exemplify this well. A former advisor to the UK and Iraqi governments on issues such as governance, democracy, and
civil rights established a grass-roots NGO (the Humanitarian Dialogue Foundation) to facilitate peace-building efforts in Iraq through information exchange. The Foundation organises lectures and YouTube videos that are filmed in London and shared with an audience in Iraq; the lectures focus on topics such as human rights, sectarian violence, and community unity, all of which promote peace-building (Kadhum, 2014). Other diasporas can use their knowledge and skills gained abroad to cultivate stronger civil society in the home country. Mohamoud (2005), for instance, found that members of seven African diasporas who were organised into CSOs in the Netherlands were better equipped to start and sustain CSOs in their respective countries of origin because of their greater knowledge of how to manage an organisation, their financial management skills, and their administrative skills. Members of the diaspora who started CSOs in their home countries were able to transmit knowledge to their local counterparts who managed the CSOs when the founders returned to the Netherlands, which contributed to capacity building of independent civil society in the home countries. The enhanced functioning of CSOs was also found to increase the resilience of certain local communities in which the local CSOs supported by the diaspora provided social infrastructures that mobilised village and community leaders, religious leaders, professionals, and entrepreneurs toward collective community ends (Mohamoud, 2005). Particularly in communities divided by ethnic conflict, such community structures can assist in cultivating trust and ensuring peaceful coexistence.

3.1.3 Lobbying/Awareness-Raising in Countries of Destination

One area of established scholarship on diasporas in conflict/peace relates to the political influence diasporas can leverage through activities such as lobbying and awareness-raising campaigns in the country of residence. The Irish diaspora in the US provides an illustrative example of how lobbying for specific political interventions in a host state can accelerate peace processes in the home country. In the 1980s, the Irish National Caucus (INC), an NGO in the US, lobbied the US government to accept the MacBride Principles, which were developed to promote fair employment for Catholics in Northern Ireland. In the late-1980s, several US states passed legislation that required US-based companies to comply with the principles, which in turn incited the British
government to draft similar legislation (such as the Fair Employment Act in 1989). In the late 1990s, then-US President Clinton signed the principles into federal law, which helped promote better economic integration of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Cochrane, Baser, & Swain, 2009). Other diasporas have lobbied host-country governments to support specific political stances against home country governments. The Chilean and Argentinian diasporas, for instance, lobbied European host governments to apply universal jurisdiction laws when former members of a regime accused of gross violations of human rights entered the territory of the host country (as is described in section 3.1) (Mey, 2008).

Other diasporas have targeted the populations of their host countries more generally with information on the conflicts occurring in their countries of origin to encourage humanitarian intervention. Some members of the Colombian diaspora in Canada, as one example, created an NGO to promote awareness about the humanitarian crisis in Colombia and to inspire better-coordinated support for campaigns for human rights in Colombia. The NGO (Life and Peace Colombia) also disseminated information on peace-building initiatives and coordinated educational tours of community leaders to Colombia (Riaño-Alcalá & Goldring, 2014). Both the Kurdish and Sri Lankan diasporas have used protests, such as sit-ins and hunger strikes, to call attention to the political or humanitarian plights of their communities in their home countries (Baser & Swain, 2010). The Tamil diaspora in Switzerland also used forms of mass media, such as a commuter tabloid, to draw public attention to how Tamils in Sri Lanka were suffering during the last battles of the civil war. The second-generation Tamil diaspora in particular used Swiss media outlets and the international/Swiss discourses on human rights to incite intervention while remaining distant from party politics in Sri Lanka (Hess & Korf, 2014). While it is unclear if such activities have actually influenced the way host-country governments or populations have reacted to the conflicts in places such as Turkey, Iraq, or Sri Lanka, such activities suggest that the diaspora can campaign in peaceable ways for intervention in homeland conflicts.

The diaspora can also use lobbying to support the creation of designated funding mechanisms for peace and reconciliation projects. The Irish diaspora in the United States, as one example, encouraged the US government to contribute to the International Fund for Ireland, a fund established by the British and Irish governments...
to support investments in cross-community reconciliation projects in Northern Ireland. Key business leaders within the Irish diaspora in the US, such as Chuck Feeney, were also instrumental in funding political entities such as the Friends of Sinn Fein, who lobbied the US government to take proactive roles in the conflict resolution process (Cochrane, Baser, & Swaim, 2009).

### 3.1.4 Transformation of Norms

A more abstract contribution that can be made by the diaspora to peace relates to the transmission of “social remittances” - behaviours, identities, ideas, and social connections (Levitt, 1998) - that can contribute to local attitudes that are more receptive to peace-building processes.

In Liberia, Antwi-Boateng (2012a) noted that the US-based diaspora acted as “norm entrepreneurs” who actively tried to transfer the norms they acquired in the US to Liberia. Such norms included the desire for reconciliation following (historic) antipathy; democracy, political pluralism, and tolerance for different political/religious identities; human rights, women’s rights, and an overall respect for diversity; the rule of law, and; transparency and accountability. The Liberian diaspora was found to make use of different mechanisms to transfer these norms, including information technology, participation in civic institutions and processes, philanthropy, religious organisation, and sports. Information technologies such as the internet, for instance, allowed the diaspora to engage in political debate with individuals remaining in the homeland via social media and internet discussion fora. The diaspora also transferred norms, particularly related to social cohesion following inter-group conflict, through formal political processes and institutions such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Process, which several diaspora members contributed expertise to (diaspora participation in such mechanisms are also described in section 3.1). Investment in local resources or institutions such as schools via philanthropic contributions was another way that the Liberian diaspora disseminated norms, particularly when those investments were non-discriminatory in nature and benefited all members of a community. Gestures of religious tolerance, such as the visit of members of different
religious congregations to different places of worship, were also used by the diaspora to promote acceptance, plurality, and tolerance.

Other diasporas have also been documented to use the internet to transfer norms relating to democracy and political inclusiveness. In a study of seven African diaspora groups residing in the Netherlands, Mohamoud (2005) found that many diaspora organisations relied on message boards and online forums to promote democratic political norms in their home countries through discussion with their home-country-based counterparts. Through these online communication tools, the diaspora also helped connect members of political parties at home to political networks in the Netherlands and further abroad. In this sense, the diaspora can enhance the social capital of members of their own network who have remained in the home country, which Mohamoud (2005) suggests can aid peace building and conflict transformation in the homeland via the empowerment of more diverse political interests.

3.1.5 **Infrastructure Development, Education, & Employment**

Within the growing literature on the role of diaspora in conflict de-escalation and post-conflict reconstruction, there has been heavy focus on the potential contributions of the diaspora to the rehabilitation of infrastructure, both through direct financial investment and through the application of knowledge to development initiatives. Specific instances of diaspora investment in infrastructure are largely absent from the literature, however. Brinkerhoff (2011) notes that (collective) remittances sent by diaspora members may enable investment in infrastructure, both during a conflict and after its cessation. In Somalia, for instance, remittances were found to support the development and expansion of communication technologies and financial service mechanisms throughout the conflict. In many countries, both financial and social capital brought by the diaspora can contribute to long-haul reconstruction needs, and such forms of capital are advantageously available even after donor commitments have shrunk (Brinkerhoff, 2011).
Specific sectors within a country, such as education, may also inspire particular investment from the diaspora. One specific example that concretely links the diaspora to the development of the educational sector relates to the mobilisation of diaspora funding to support school construction in Rwanda. A 2009 conference of the Rwanda Diaspora Global Network in collaboration with the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs led to the establishment of the “One Dollar” campaign, which encouraged Rwandans in the diaspora and Rwandans inside the country to contribute to a development fund. This fund was then used to construct student housing for youth who had been orphaned by the genocide (Turner, 2013). Another example comes from the Sudanese diaspora in the Netherlands, whose educational support activities were documented by van der Linden, Blaak, and Andrew (2013). The authors profiled three specific projects financed and organised by the Dutch-based (South) Sudanese diaspora, which respectively aimed to support primary education, education and housing for street children, and vocational training for children and youth. The three micro-development projects were founded by refugees residing in the Netherlands, all of whom were motivated by desires to foster human capital development in South Sudan. The project on primary education specifically aimed to rebuild a school for primary education in one region of South Sudan so that children in that region would be less prone to recruitment into armed groups (van der Linden, Blaak, & Andrew, 2013). While the authors note that these initiatives had limited success as of the writing because of practical, security, and financial challenges on the ground, such initiatives are notable because they represent the mobilisation of diaspora support for apolitical, local-level development objectives that can contribute to peace-building. The diaspora may more directly contribute to peace consolidation through support of education and employment of disarmed and demobilised combatants. In Somalia, for instance, remittances received by former combatants were found to prevent them from re-engaging in violence, particularly during the peace-keeping and conflict management stages when few economic opportunities existed in the local economy (Brinkerhoff, 2011).

There is some evidence to suggest that rather than directly investing in educational infrastructure and services, the diaspora can encourage their countries of (ancestral) origin to prioritise investment in education through the exercise of soft power. Antwi-Boateng (2012b) found the in Liberia, one member of the diaspora who was invited to speak at Independence Day celebrations influenced the president to draft and
implement a policy for free compulsory education through his speech, which addressed the key role of education in promoting long-term development. As the speaker was not vying for public office, his comments were regarded as reflecting a higher moral standard and as recommendations that the country should pursue rather than as self-interested notions.

Within the larger migration and development literature, the diaspora has been emphasised as an important source of knowledge that can better development outcomes by becoming educators of the local population. Both organised and spontaneous diaspora return may occur for the sake of building capacity in the country of origin, particularly through the training of staff. Programmes such as IOM’s Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programme, UNDP’s Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Networks (TOKTEN) programme, and IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) initiative are examples of larger coordinated efforts to facilitate the temporary and virtual return of the diaspora to their home countries for the purpose of exchanging knowledge and training local populations. Some diaspora-led initiatives also aim to build the knowledge capacity of local institutions through diaspora training. In Afghanistan, for instance, the NGO Afghans4Tomorrow support members of the Afghan-American diaspora to take leave from their jobs to return to Afghanistan, where they can contribute their knowledge to local rebuilding efforts (Brinkerhoff, 2011).

3.1.6 Subsistence Support & Provision of Humanitarian or Other Emergency Assistance

While related less to peace specifically and more to development in general, one important contribution the diaspora can make is to the livelihood security of people remaining in conflict zones through the provision of remittances. Horst et al (2010) note that in situations of conflict, large shares of the population may face income or resource insecurity due to health-related expenses, the disruption of local economies, inflation following resource scarcity, and lack of social protection by the state. These factors can create situations in which the local population needs assistance from other actors,
including the diaspora, to finance basic subsistence. Studies on diasporas from countries and regions as dispersed as Croatia (Skrbiš, 2007), Somalia (Abdile & Pirkkalainen, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2006, 2011), the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region (Mohamoud, 2005), and Sri Lanka (Zunzer, 2004) have found that remittances sent by individual migrants can play an essential role in buoying the resilience of households in conflict-affected settings by providing support for basic subsistence needs, including food, clothing, and shelter.

The financial and human capital resources that diaspora members send to their home countries can also play an important role in addressing urgent humanitarian needs during times of disaster and conflict. Diaspora remittances, philanthropy, and volunteerism have all been used in past and contemporary conflicts and emergencies to address immediate humanitarian needs. The larger African diaspora, for instance, raised substantial financial resources to help combat the spread of Ebola during the 2014/5 outbreaks (Chikezie, 2015), and the Haitian (Fang, 2015) and Pakistani (Brinkerhoff, 2011) diasporas both raised substantial sums of money for relief efforts following the respective earthquakes in 2010 and 2005.

In the ongoing civil conflict in Syria, the Syrian diaspora has not only raised funds for relief efforts for those displaced within and beyond Syria but has also directly facilitated the delivery of assistance. As noted in a 2015 report on the international and local actors who have responded to the humanitarian crisis in Syrian, the formal humanitarian system—chiefly through international aid agencies—has not maintained a physical presence in Syria, a gap that has been filled by local NGOs. Many local NGOs have been created or supported by members of the diaspora, and their presence in local communities affected by the conflict has been essential to ensuring that assistance is provided on local level (Svoboda & Pantuliano, 2015).

3.2  Factors Influencing Diasporas as Peace Facilitators

As the previous section has shown diaspora groups can play various roles in assisting conflict de-escalation and movement toward peace. These can change over time often in response to developments in the country of origin as well as in the country of destination. Moreover, as heterogeneous social formations, research points to the
diverse strategies adopted by different groups of diasporas from the same origin. This sections aims to shed light on the different factors influencing diaspora contribution to peace, by focussing on diaspora group dynamics and the transnational political opportunity factors shaping diaspora engagement in conflict. The way diasporas are and become involved is shaped by, among other factors, the transnational opportunity structure and specific characteristics of diaspora groups, thus the interplay between structure and agency that has to be taken into account (Gaas & Horst, 2009). The transnational opportunity structure refers to the political opportunity structures in the country of residence as well as in the country of origin that provide both constraints and opportunities and shape what diasporas can and cannot do. Moreover, the capacity and desire of diasporas, along with dynamics between groups within a diaspora influence the nature of involvement in the conflict.

3.2.1 Diaspora Groups & Their Sources of Collective Identity

Collective identity, or sometimes called group consciousness, is at the centre of diaspora concepts and seen as the key features that creates cohesiveness among the members and trigger transnational engagement. Ethnicity, religion and nationality, thus, are often used, both internally and externally, to set the boundaries of different diaspora groups (Cohen, 2008; Sheffer, 2006). While these labels seem at the surface helpful to identify the various diaspora groups in conflict settings, these also might conceal great differences within these groups. For instance, Kurds in Germany mainly organised along separate ideological, religious or regional lines, where often the different national backgrounds resulted in great variation regarding the strategies to the resolution of the Kurdish question. In contrast, Kurdish groups in Sweden were able to construct a pan-Kurdish identity, by forming associations that unified Kurds from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey (Baser, 2013). In the UK, ethnic, social and political cleavages existing in the homeland, were reproduced by Bosnian diaspora groups leading to little sense of community and high fragmentation among the groups (Kelly, 2003). In the case of Bosnians in Sweden, the absence of the social-psychological infrastructure created by the war, resulted in less in-group favouritism, lesser importance of ethnic identities and stronger support for a more multicultural vision of society in the country of origin (Hall, 2010). As multi-layered social formations diaspora groups, therefore, challenge the
perception of conformity between territory, culture and identity and point to the multidimensionality and fluidity of collective identities. Moreover, the examples elaborated above highlight the fact that different transnationalisation patterns might exist in each destination country.

Moreover, diaspora groups and their sources of network identity should not be considered just along national, ethnic and religious lines, but also based on gender, professional networks and political affiliation. It is the intersection of class, professional, ethnic and gendered hierarchies that create fragmentation, power relations and competition among and within groups (Baser, 2014; Koinova, 2011; Walton, 2014). These processes might also influence who is included and excluded from diaspora mobilisation. Al-Ali et al. (2001) argue that beside motivation or desire, the individual’s capacity influence the way and form of diaspora engagement. In particular education, employment and a secure legal status seem to be major factors that promote diaspora engagement since these influence the capacity and ability to get involved (Hammond, 2013; Koser, 2007; Warnecke, 2010). If collective action of diasporas are a result of transnational mobilisation activities by a small elite of political entrepreneurs, these risk to reproduce pre-existing power asymmetries rather than challenging them (Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003).

In particular in complex conflicts, with diverse armed actors, who are affiliated to different fractions and with multiple and fluid relationships between different rebel groups, the relationships to respective diaspora groups is not always clearly identifiable. The multi-layered nature of diasporas constitutes great challenges of identifying and selecting legitimate groups as partners for development and peacebuilding. Hence a complex understanding of the conflict, including knowledge on the different actors (local and transnational) is needed to design policies and select diasporas groups as partners for peacebuilding and development. When collaborating with diasporas groups, attention should also be paid to fragmentation, power relations and competition based on class, professional, ethnic and gendered hierarchies that, in order to avoid unintended intensification of the conflict and tensions between groups. Herein, policies that promote dialogues between groups and aim at empowering less powerful actors provide a potential basis for the peacebuilding process in the long term.
3.2.2 Transnational Opportunity Structure

Studies highlight the transnational dimension of opportunities, which emphasises how opportunity structures in both country of origin and destination shape diaspora engagements. According to Wayland (2004) people who originate from a closed society and migrate to a more open society “are able to capitalise on newfound freedoms to publish, organise, and accumulate financial resources to an extent that was impossible in the homeland” (p.417). At the same time, long distance public policies of the country of origin might oppress political movements even in the diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Transnational political opportunities structures, therefore refer to opportunities and constrains in the country of destination, the country of origin and the transnational sphere, which have to be analysed in connection (Sökefeld, 2006). Transnational political opportunity structures thus help to explain why the success of a diaspora groups in homeland conflict often vary over time and place (Wayland, 2004).

Government practices in the country of origin might oppress political movements even in the diaspora and therefore bring politically active members of diasporas into “exiles while abroad”. Turkey, as one example of strategies in long distance public policy, created a system of surveillance through consulates and embassies, oppressing diasporic political movements and activities as people feared repercussions in the country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). In contrast, socio-economic and political incentives provided by the country of origin can enable diaspora contributions to peace and reinforce the interest in the origin country’s development (Burgess, 2014). In the case of Rwanda, the government showed that engaging the diaspora is a central part of peacebuilding and post-genocide state building. Yet, diaspora engagement policy did not appeal to the diaspora as a whole but rather favour specific fractions or subgroups creating an environment for inclusion and exclusion for particular groups (S. Turner, 2013). Attitudes of governments and local elites towards different diaspora groups and vice versa therefore determines if a coalition is formed or a relationship is rejected (Antwi-Boateng, 2012a; Maria Koinova, 2011). Beside policies, critical social and political events, such as revolutionary struggle, conflicts or natural disaster, can shape and influence diaspora consciousness and mobilise members to take action (Hammond et al., 2011; Hess & Korf, 2014; Koinova, 2011; Skrbis, 2007). For instance, in the case of
the Yugoslavian conflict, Croatian diaspora groups chose different actions and strategies throughout the conflict cycle, highlighting the fact that diaspora engagement should be analysed dynamically in the specific historical context (Skrbis, 2007). The efficacy of diaspora contribution is also influenced by the availability of local partners as well as practical, security and financial challenges on the ground, which might prevent the implementation of concrete projects (Warnecke, 2010).

Important factors in the country of destination are migrant incorporation regimes and multiculturalism policies. In general, more democratic countries that adopt cultural pluralism and multiculturalism provide more freedom and space for diaspora activism and enable diaspora groups to unfold their ethnic and religious identities (Kadhum, 2014; Shain & Barth, 2003; Sökefeld, 2006). For instance, by analysing migrant mobilisation in Switzerland and France, Giugni and Passy (2004) argue that differences in the political opportunity structure influence the strategies, forms and content of mobilisation. If diaspora mobilisation is repressed and, at the same time, confronted with a lack of access to political institution, radicalisation of the movement tends to be more likely. Since diasporas do not act in a political vacuum, the measures they implement and the strategies they choose often match with the host country's policies and the broader public discourse (Al-Ali, 2007; M. Koinova, 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). While these might be favourable for some diaspora groups, they can be constraining for others. For instance, Eritrean groups were much more able to raise awareness in Germany where their case was seen as justified, while Kurdish diaspora groups faced more challenges due to the ban of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the tension between Kurdish and Turkish groups importing the conflict to Germany (Turner, 2008). However, when Kurdish groups changed their goal from supporting communism and socialism to promoting human rights and democracy, they received more support from German policymakers and NGOs (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Similar, Liberian diaspora groups in the US changed their strategies from more deconstructive actions to peace promotion due to shifting demands in the country of origin, changes of the US foreign policy towards promotion of democracy in Africa and regional and international effort at promoting peace-building norms (Antwi-Boateng, 2012a). However, framing demands in the language of development, human rights and democracy can also be a cover for a hidden agenda of diaspora groups, which actually aims at favouring their own families, clans or ethnic groups (Horst et al., 2010).
Moreover, a perceived lack of interest towards diaspora stances could also motivate diaspora to take action in order to raise awareness for their claims (Hess & Korf, 2014). It is thus important to highlight, that the public discourse is also shaped and influenced by diasporic actions (Horst, 2013). The institutional framework and funding mechanisms in the destination country also influence the capacity of diaspora organisations to contribute to peace and development in the country of origin and often shape the focus and the activities of diaspora organisation. In many countries, diaspora organisations often face a lack of structural funds and heavily rely on the contributions of diaspora members to fund their operational budgets. Such financial arrangements may lead to competition for resources among groups, which could lead to increased tensions and conflicts between different fractions (Warnecke, 2010). Moreover, studies report that counter-terrorism laws and measures introduced after 9/11 pose a risk of criminalising financial transaction from diasporas. Hence, these might limit the ability of groups to generate both internal and external funds, since accountability and transparency of the usage of financial contributions is often limited in conflict settings. Moreover, Counter-terrorism measures also create practical challenges because negotiating with armed non-state actors is often crucial in gaining access to people in need (Hammond et al., 2011; Svoboda & Pantuliano, 2015).

Transnational political opportunity structures, both in the country of origin and the destination country, help to explain why the success of a diaspora groups in homeland conflict often vary over time and place, since these provide both opportunities and constrains for diaspora mobilisation. However, these seem to be group and conflict specific and therefore might empower some groups, while also constraining others. The exclusion of groups might also increase radicalisation, leading to further intensification of the conflict. Hence, as step towards sustainable peace, policy makers should enter into dialogue with different elements of the diaspora and promote mediation and cooperation between/among them. Creating links with local actors (such as local NGOs) might also increase the efficacy of diaspora engagement in the peacebuilding process of the country of origin.
4 CONCLUSION

This background paper demonstrates the complexity inherent to the diaspora construct, the forms of contributions the diaspora can make to conflict and post-conflict countries of origin, and the multiplicity of factors that shape how (and what) diasporas contribute. These complexities have important implications for how development cooperation can interact with the diaspora in shaping joint interventions in countries experiencing or recovering from conflict.

4.1 Potentials for Constructive Engagement & Cooperation

From the development cooperation perspective, the diaspora could be a valuable ally to bring into country-specific programming and interventions because of their unique identities, experiences, and capacities.

Members of the diaspora, regardless of generation, may belong to multiple communities based on compound and multifaceted identities. These identities often imply that members of the diaspora have intimate knowledge about several different countries and communities, which allows them to more fluidly navigate both “home” and “host” countries. Belonging to multiple identity groups gives the diaspora the opportunity to be embedded in multiple country systems, making them ideal facilitators of connections between societies of origin and residence. As transnational social agents, the diaspora play an important role in matching resources across spaces and of growing the network of institutions and individuals who work in (post-)conflict environments. Even diaspora members of the second and third generation can be involved in multiple societies at once and can be effective liaisons between institutions and individuals in different countries due to their transnational set of norms and values (Freitas, 2012).

In addition to having wider and deeper social networks across different countries, transnational diaspora members are often uniquely knowledgeable about the norms, standards, constraints, and resources inherent to different country contexts. This knowledge is hugely beneficial for development cooperation in the design of country-
specific programming. The diaspora may have a more-in-depth understanding of the historical roots and expression of a conflict, of the actors in a conflict and their desires, and of the larger social, political, and economic systems in which a conflict is embedded. This knowledge is essential in developing more efficient interventions that take into account the complex relationships that shape implementation.

Members of the diaspora may have different motivations to contribute to their countries of (ancestral) origin, but many will be united in a desire to contribute to the country of origin over time and regardless of the presence or absence of conflict. Remittances are often characterised as being countercyclical, in that they may be sent to the country of origin during times when other forms of foreign capital are being withdrawn; different types of diaspora contributions may be considered this way, as the diaspora may have greater willingness and incentive to continue contributing to the country of origin even during high-risk times. Such willingness to provide assistance during high-risk periods coupled with the long-term commitment of the diaspora to the country of origin make diaspora members natural partners in long-term peace and reconstruction efforts. Unlike donor funding, which is generally finite and tied to particular funding cycles, diaspora contributions may be more reliable over time. The long-term commitment of the diaspora has another positive advantage: diaspora members who participated in on-the-ground efforts over longer periods of time will have better knowledge about what has been tried (or has not), what has worked (or what has not), and what lessons can be learned from past experiences and passed on to future interventions. Unlike many country offices of international organisations in which staff is regularly posted for finite periods of time, diaspora members may have greater opportunity to build up and benefit from “institutional memory”.

As potential partners in development cooperation, the diaspora may also be differentiated from international organisations by their greater access to areas in the country that are inaccessible to other actors. Given their intimate knowledge of the country, access to diverse social networks, and higher risk thresholds, the diaspora may be able to work in areas that the international community is either unable or unwilling to. This trend has strongly emerged from Syria, where diaspora-run or supported NGOs have been found to offer essential services to populations that are not addressed by international organisations (Svoboda & Pantuliano, 2015). International organisations
and actors who work with the diaspora may also benefit from the local embeddedness of diaspora members in different ways: they may be perceived as more legitimate than other international actors because of their collaborations with diaspora members who are accepted by and knowledgeable about the local community (Horst et al., 2010).

4.2 Potential Risks & Pitfalls

The diaspora may be beneficial partners to development cooperation, but collaboration with them is not without risk, which must be considered before the diaspora is chosen as a partner or ally. “The” diaspora is comprised of both individuals and groups of individuals (e.g., associations and organisations); each may have their own histories, interests, and agendas, which have to be evaluated and reconciled with that of the development cooperation organisation. Any diaspora is also generally not homogenous and may be internally fragmented based on ethnicity, generation, history of movement or displacement, relationship to the conflict, and length of stay in the country of residence (among other factors). These different characteristics may imply that diasporas have both different motivations to collaborate with development cooperation as well as different expectations about what that collaboration will entail and generate. It also implies that the diaspora may have different relationships to the home country, its government, and local communities that affect their capacity to act as agents of peace and development. Before engagement with the diaspora is sought, it is therefore imperative to assess who the diaspora is and how they relate to the larger diaspora community.

Acknowledging that the diaspora is internally differentiated also highlights the need to consider why particular members of the diaspora should be sought for collaboration and why others should not. The choice to collaborate with a particular individual or group may place development cooperation at odds with other elements of the diaspora, particularly when there are already internal tensions or competition for leadership or resources, such as funding, within the diaspora. This speaks to the issue of legitimacy and of selecting “legitimate” representatives of the diaspora. In choosing collaborators from the diaspora, it is important for development cooperation to be cognisant of
several features of the diaspora, including: the individual/group’s agenda and the possibility that they may have hidden agendas, of which conflict aggravation of perpetuation may be one; the diaspora’s capacity to influence the conflict in the country of origin; the diaspora’s interest in peace; potential biases that the diaspora may have to their own kin, ethnic, political, or religious groups, and; the features of the diaspora that may compromise their perceived legitimacy in the country of origin.

The factors that can challenge the peace-building capacities of the diaspora in the country of origin may also carry implications for the country of residence. In some cases diaspora groups may “import” homeland tensions or conflicts to the host societies, particularly when such conflict involves opposing ethnic or religious groups (as been seen in in the case of Kurdish and Turkish groups in Germany). This can undermine intra-group solidarity and erode the chances of building larger “coalitions” of the diaspora that will work toward peace-building initiatives in the country of origin. Fragmentation within the diaspora can also undermine public perceptions in the country of residence about the value or trustworthiness of the diaspora as a whole. As one example, the very visible support that some members of the Tamil diaspora have shown for the LTTE has served to problematise the entire Sri Lankan diaspora is some countries (Horst et al., 2010), which can make the prospects of collaborating with any elements of the diaspora more risky for development cooperation actors. The development of anti-terrorism legislation in some countries may further stigmatise diaspora groups who are actively engaged with the home country. The criminalisation of some remittance transfer channels, for instance, may signal to a wider public that all members of the diaspora are somehow connected to terrorism, which can make engagement with the diaspora more sensitive.

4.3 **Recommendations**

Given the potential advantages and risks of diaspora collaboration discussed, there are several concrete recommendations that development cooperation agents can follow to enhance the chances of fostering efficient partnerships with the diaspora:
1. Before selecting members/organisations from within the diaspora to collaborate with, conduct preliminary mappings of diaspora groups in the country of residence. Particular questions to be answered include: when did the diaspora arrive in the country of residence, and what motivated their choice to migrate; are there clear “cohorts” of individuals who arrived at different times and under different circumstances? What are the demographic characteristics of the diaspora (including ethnic group membership, age cohorts, educational profiles, professional profiles)? How is the diaspora organised, and are there tensions between groups within the diaspora? Which parts of the diaspora support different regimes?

2. Conduct rapid assessments of diaspora countries of origin that provide contextualised understanding about the country’s history, population structure, and history of (contemporary) conflict.

3. Conduct more in-depth analysis of the conflict to better understand opportunities for peace-building on the ground. Questions to be answered include: how did the conflict start and why? Who are national and local-level actors in the conflict, and what are their aims? How does the diaspora relate to the conflict and to local-level actors (e.g., governments, rebel groups, oppositional political groups), and what does this imply for their contributions to conflict de-escalation and eventual reconciliation?

4. Assist the diaspora in improving their positions in the country of residence, which both enhance their effectiveness as peace-builders and their perceived legitimacy as development cooperation partners. This can entail two types of improvements:
   a. Strengthening the capacities of the diaspora vis-à-vis their positions as migrants: This can include encouraging the development of pathways to integration such as access to language courses, access to long-term legal residence and/or citizenship, and access to social/civic engagement opportunities.
   b. Strengthening the organisational capacities of the diaspora as active participants in civil society: This can include offering trainings, seminars, and workshops that help diaspora groups improve their organisations’ health and capabilities. Particular emphasis can be placed on financial
management, long-term planning, monitoring and evaluation, and collaborative approaches across organisations and sectors. Emphasis can also be placed on fostering the creation of pan-ethnic organisations that develop conciliatory organisational agendas.
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