



# Guiding framework for GIZ's work in the security sector

Sectoral Department | updated September 2023

# Introduction

As a federal enterprise acting on behalf of the German Government's ministries and other donors, GIZ is carrying out projects that help pave the way for security as the foundation for peace, stability, and development. In the 'Guiding framework for GIZ's work in the security sector', GIZ defines its commitment in the field of security. For GIZ, security as a field of activity encompasses all measures geared to actors in the security sector with the aim of increasing their effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability. These measures help improve human security in different geographic and social spaces (e.g., border areas, state peripheries, and urban areas).

Major developments and trends of recent years in terms of security policy – from the war of aggression against Ukraine and the increasing inter-system competition with autocratic regimes to the withdrawal of the international coalition from Afghanistan and the consequences of climate change and new hybrid threats – have implications for society as a whole and represent a turning point for the international order. At the same time, they pose enormous challenges for Germany's foreign, security and development policy in terms of mode of operation and capacity to act. New strategy documents and guidelines at German, European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) level reflect these developments in the security sector. Germany's engagement in this field of activity is also influenced by the experiences and lessons learned from the missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali, which were motivated by security policy concerns.

This updated 'Guiding framework for GIZ's work in the security sector' reflects these developments and takes their consequences into account. Its aim is to highlight the specific added value GIZ can contribute field of the security under the current conditions for foreign, security and development policy and to provide GIZ staff with the company's understanding and principles for the work in the field of security. In addition, this document aims to support the dialogue with GIZ's commissioning parties, clients, and partners, to identify areas of intervention, and to identify and manage risks. GIZ's service profiles for selected areas of security specify this guiding framework.

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# I. Framework conditions in foreign, security and development policy for GIZ's work in the field of security

**The international security architecture is changing:** Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine represents a turning point for the principle of a multilateral, rules-based order, and the understanding of collective security. This watershed brings with it profound changes for German foreign, security and development policy ('Zeitenwende'). National and alliance defence requirements as well as dealing with system competition and responding to geopolitical shifts must be balanced with the continuing high demand for crisis response management.

**The relevance of security for international cooperation continues to grow:** With war in Europe, increasing geopolitical tensions between nation states, and a continued high number of violent domestic and regional conflicts, security issues are becoming more relevant, and military and intelligence capabilities and logics are growing in importance. The resurgence of geostrategic and geo-economic zones of influence and interests as well as the global increase in defence spending, also affects international cooperation.

**Digital progress is changing the field of security:** Technological and digital change in the security sector is rapid. Beyond this sector too, this change often has a security policy dimension, for example in the development of artificial intelligence or the expansion of (critical) digital infrastructure. Complex hybrid threats, cyber-attacks or attempts to manipulate elections threaten Germany's internal security just as much as that of our partner countries. As a result, the technical and methodological requirements in security as a field of activity are changing and expanding.

**Germany's ambition to shape security is set out in a new strategy document – the National Security Strategy:** According to the strategy, the German Government will use its foreign, security and development policy instruments to act in a fundamentally changed international environment in a values-based and interest-driven manner. The strategy introduces the concept of 'integrated security' as a further development of 'networked security' and defines this as 'the collaborative interaction of all relevant actors, resources and instruments that, in combination, can comprehensively guarantee the security of our country and strengthen it against external threats.' What is new here is that integrated security is set as an objective spanning various policy areas that must have an impact both internally and externally. In doing so, responses to complex threats are identified and addressed through preventative action, intervention, and follow-up measures by targeted and substantial interlocking of different policy fields and their instruments. The underlying concept of security is interpreted broadly and focuses on the concept of human security. The will to shape the future as set out in the security strategy is also accompanied by the expectation that GIZ will play an active role in security issues.



Raw material mining in Sierra Leone

**Complex challenges require integrated approaches – such as a secure supply of raw materials and energy or the climate and security nexus:** Numerous topics, for example the supply of raw materials and energy, the protection of critical infrastructure, the challenges in coping with climate change, disaster prevention, digitalisation, health and technology, as well as social cohesion and resilience, are recognised as being relevant in terms of security policy. The domains of internal and external security are becoming increasingly blurred and are closely intertwined with geopolitical interests and global power issues. As a result, addressing security policy challenges in an integrated manner will involve taking a broader approach and will necessitate new cooperation arrangements. The simultaneity of globalisation and transnationalisation on the one hand, and the fragmentation, regionalisation and re-nationalisation of the international order on the other, calls for flexibility and political intuition in developing options for action. At the same time, specific challenges in the field of security, such as cooperation with security sector actors, persist and continue to require a clear understanding and targeted approaches.

**The partner landscape and the interests of partners are changing:** As the world order becomes more complex, partner countries in the field of international cooperation are increasingly focusing on their own security and regulatory interests, such as the protection of their populations and their territorial integrity. They demand appropriate support and select their (international) partners confidently. In some cases, these are private providers of military, police, and intelligence security services.

## These changes in the framework conditions have fundamental implications for GIZ's engagement in security as a field of activity:

- While the framework conditions for GIZ's work in the security sector are changing and, for example, additional sectors are being recognised as relevant to security, the challenges in the field of activity itself remain. This requires GIZ to raise its external profile in the field of security and to communicate its expertise more clearly. In addition, it is important to systematically analyse how integrated security approaches can be implemented across different fields of activity and how this is reflected in the services GIZ offers.
- In the field of security, we can also see how development and international cooperation is becoming an instrument and battleground for geopolitical disputes and system competition – not least in view of how other states engage. This also means that GIZ operates in contexts where partnerships can occur as an expression of anti-Western resentment. There is also the possibility that access to the security sector, which is already difficult in some partner countries, will be further restricted. Therefore, development and international cooperation is expected not only to be highly flexible in its implementation in the field of security, but also to apply multisectoral approaches and to take a forward-looking approach in partnerships with actors with whom there may be no common value base.
- Direct cooperation with and support for security sector actors in the context of train and equip as well as providing infrastructure ('Enable and Enhance'), is gaining in importance. These actors are responsible for safeguarding the security interests of partner countries externally and for implementing a legitimate state monopoly on the use of force and protecting people internally. As security issues become more relevant, the capacity of legitimate actors in

the security sector to act becomes ever more decisive. In many implementation contexts, there is also the increasing presence of semi-state or non-state security actors (militias, mercenaries, private military service providers), with whom GIZ as well as its commissioning parties and partners must deal. In addition, security sector actors occupy important positions of power in politics and business in many partner countries (including because of coups d'état). Their importance therefore extends beyond the security sector to other sectors. Cooperation with these actors requires continuous assessment of their added value and a consideration of interdependencies.

## II. Interests and priority areas of commissioning parties and partners

**The political interests of our commissioning parties and partners guide our engagement:** In addition to meeting the development and security needs of the partner country, projects in the security sector increasingly serve the specific interests of our commissioning parties as regards foreign, security, geopolitical and domestic policy. Besides improving security on the ground, GIZ projects thus also promote bilateral and multilateral relations, contribute to the implementation of international political agendas, and support national foreign and security policy interests. One of the major policy objectives of our commissioning parties and clients is working on global and transnational security challenges that pose a threat to Germany's internal security. These complex motivations and interests often result in GIZ projects being caught between a whole range of diverging goals, expectations, and timescales of commissioning parties and partners.

**Priority areas of commissioning parties and partners:** Over the past 25 years, GIZ's activities in the security sector have developed in line with the strategic and programmatic priorities of our commissioning parties and partners (see page 7).



GIZ event on critical resources at the Munich Security Conference 2023



For the **German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)**, the focus is on linking peace, development and security and thereby contributing to human security. Measures in the field of security remain geared to achieving development goals.



With the creation of the Directorate-General S, the **German Federal Foreign Office (AA)** has broadened the scope of its foreign policy engagement to include crisis prevention, stabilisation, and peacebuilding, as well as enable and enhance partner countries military capabilities. The respective toolkit focuses on the field of security, i.e., direct cooperation with actors from the security sector.



The **German Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg)** and the **German Federal Foreign Office (AA)** jointly support procurement, the provision of equipment and supplies, training, and education measures as well as infrastructure measures for both military and civilian security sector actors in partner countries within the framework of Germany's Enable & Enhance Initiative (E2I).



The **German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI)** and its subordinate agencies (Federal Police, Federal Criminal Police Office) support police forces in partner countries, primarily in the context of police training and equipment assistance (including equipment and supplies, training and development, and infrastructure measures).



Over the past decade, the **European Union (EU)** has become an important multilateral actor in the field of security and a major commissioning party of GIZ. Funding instruments such as the Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and the European Peace Facility (EPF) provide civilian measures (capacity building, training, and equipment) related to the security sector as well as support measures to strengthen the military and defence capacities of partner states and organisations.

### III. GIZ's orientation in the security sector

**For GIZ, the security field of activity encompasses all measures geared to actors in the security sector with the aim of increasing their effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability:** GIZ assists in establishing and strengthening a security sector that meets the needs of the population in line with democratic and human rights standards and principles and follows the rule of law. This support helps improve human security in different geographic and social spaces (e.g., border areas, state peripheries and urban areas).

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**The concept of human security guides GIZ's engagement in security as a field of activity: This concept goes beyond a traditional, state-centred notion of security and is based on the right of every individual to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty, fear, want and despair.**

GIZ's measures focus on establishing and reinforcing the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This monopoly is based on the premise that citizens of a state abstain as individuals from asserting their rights and claims by force and surrender this prerogative to the state security sector, which is bound to the state's legal system.

**Partners and target groups for measures in the field of security:** Actors in the security sector play a pivotal role in implementing the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force and overseeing its implementation. They are therefore of central importance for the field of security as a whole and the most important

target audience for GIZ's measures. The legitimacy of security actors is crucial for GIZ's orientation in the field of security. The state security sector can only help support peace, stability, and development if it is perceived by the population as legitimate and effective in safeguarding security.

**The actors of the security sector comprise state and non-state agencies as well as oversight bodies:**

- State security and justice actors include the police, customs and border guards, the armed forces, intelligence agencies, public prosecutors, and the penal system.
- Non-state security and justice actors include citizens' militias, private security service providers and armed groups, but also the traditional justice system.
- State oversight authorities include relevant parliamentary committees and ministries, ombudspersons and human rights and anti-corruption institutions.
- Non-state oversight institutions include in particular civil society organisations and independent media.



## GIZ's approach and instruments in the field of security:

- **Security sector reform/governance:** GIZ promotes institutional, parliamentary, judicial, and civil society oversight of security forces through the development of policy and strategy frameworks and legislative reforms. Commissioned by: AA, BMZ.
- **Police development and reform:** GIZ supports police forces in partner countries in building capacity and improving their relations with citizens. This includes reforms to local policing through a community policing approach. Commissioned by: Federal Foreign Office, BMZ.
- **Training security actors and providing equipment and supplies (enable and enhance):** GIZ supports in particular police and military security actors with equipment (no weapons, see principle 5) and infrastructure measures. The joint Enable & Enhance Initiative (E2I) of the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) and the European Peace Facility (EPF) are relevant funding lines for this purpose. Commissioned by: Federal Foreign Office, BMVg, EU, BMI (for police forces).
- **Integrated border governance:** GIZ supports the definition and demarcation of unclear or disputed borders, the prevention of border-related conflicts through cross-border community cooperation, and the development and dissemination of border governance policies by regional organisations. Commissioned by: Federal Foreign Office, EU.
- **Promoting regional security architectures:** GIZ provides capacity building for multidimensional peace missions, conflict early warning systems and mediation, as well as related issues such as maritime security. In addition, it supports the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in implementing regional stabilisation strategies and assisting their member states in building national early warning centres and national peace infrastructures, preventing violence in the context of elections, and implementing national transitional justice processes. Commissioned by: BMZ, Federal Foreign Office, EU.
- **Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration/control of means of violence:** GIZ strengthens the capacity of its partners to control the proliferation of weapons and ammunition and supports the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants. Commissioned by: Federal Foreign Office, EU, BMZ.
- **Combating transnational organised crime:** GIZ supports cross-institutional and cross-border cooperation, criminal prosecution, victim protection and community resilience to organised crime. Commissioned by: Federal Foreign Office, BMZ, EU.
- **Preventing and countering violent extremism:** GIZ implements prevention measures in a variety of areas to address the root causes of and enhance resilience to radicalisation, as well as to support partners in countering violent extremism in a human rights-based manner. Commissioned by: Federal Foreign Office, BMZ, EU.
- **Digital and hybrid threats:** GIZ supports data and information security in the digital space, promotes the protection of critical infrastructure such as laboratory safety in partner countries, and empowers partners to address disinformation campaigns more effectively and increase the population's resilience to such campaigns. Commissioned by: Federal Foreign Office, BMZ, EU.

**Refining the integrated approach:** In future, GIZ's work will increasingly encompass topics relating to security policy that lie outside the field of activity of security as defined here. This means that not all elements of integrated security are dealt with in the security field of activity – i.e., in direct cooperation with security sector actors. Conversely, this means that projects in other sectors also make a genuine contribution to security and that other areas of development and international cooperation are increasingly assessed from a security policy perspective.

Even in the face of changed framework conditions for the security sector, GIZ's engagement is based on a proven technical orientation and tried-and-tested approaches and instruments that are continuously developed further and adapted to meet needs.



Destruction of small arms in the Democratic Republic of Congo

## IV. GIZ principles in the field of security

These overarching principles serve to bring together the different objectives and expectations of commissioning parties and partners to implement them effectively while minimising unintended negative results. Not all the challenges in the security sector can be resolved just by applying these principles. Particularly when formulating political objectives, any unresolved issues must be resolved in close liaison with commissioning parties and partners.




- As our commissioning parties and partners have a broad variety of sometimes diverging interests, we seek to engage in dialogue at an early stage to clarify the political objective, as well as to review relevant aspects of the anticipated results. Conflicting objectives, contradictions and unintended negative effects are addressed in the process.
- Establishing coherence and compatibility of the objectives and results specified by different commissioning parties and clients at the implementation level is a key element of GIZ's project planning and implementation. Individual GIZ projects to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), for example, bring together civilian, police and military components at project level and deliver joint results.



**Principle 2: We focus on the connection between measures in the field of security and human security.**

- We adopt a human-rights-based approach that focuses on individuals' and groups' need for and right to protection (leave no one behind, LNOB). This way, we help ensure that strengthening the security sector does not impinge on political and civil rights or freedoms.
- We integrate the perspectives of women and marginalised groups into our work to promote effectiveness, ownership, and better oversight of the security sector. Gender equality and the promotion of gender transformative approaches are key to building an inclusive, gender equitable, and thus legitimate security sector.
- We involve civil society actors to foster transparency, enable an exchange between the population and representatives of the security sector on security and protection needs, and (re)build and strengthen trust on both sides. For this purpose, we square the support needs of the security actors with the security needs of the population by means of in-depth analysis.
- Occasionally, we involve non-state or semi-state security actors in our work, especially when they are the de-facto providers of security for the population due to a weak state not able to execute the monopoly on the use of force. Dealing with illegitimate state, semi- or non-state security and violent actors requires rigorous case-by-case consideration, risk assessment, and coordinated policy evaluation.

- We follow a layered level approach to establish the connection between security sector reform and the principle of human security. To this end, our projects take a multi-level approach, encompassing not only the macro and meso levels but also the micro level (e.g., through training and equipment).



**Principle 3: We embed support for security as a field of activity in the broader context of international and development cooperation.**

- We define the interfaces to relevant topics such as crisis prevention, stabilisation, and peacebuilding, as well as reconstruction, reconciliation, or decentralisation from the perspective of integrated security. Through these interfaces, the systemic challenges and reform needs for peace and governance are considered and classified with a view to the security sector (multisectoral, integrated approach).
- We take ongoing policy dialogue processes as a frame of reference to address sensitive issues and critical reform needs (e.g. gender, human rights, and corruption in the security sector). We do this in cooperation with bilateral and multilateral actors, such as the UN, and specialised non-governmental organisations.
- We provide short-term or purely technical support, such as equipment or construction measures as part of the Enable & Enhance Initiative. This can include stand-alone measures that, for example, enable partner militaries to conduct crisis prevention and crisis management on their own. It can be used to build trust with national partners or to prepare and initiate more long-term changes in the security sector.



**Principle 4: We work in partnerships with German and international security actors and institutions.**

- Cooperation with the German police and armed forces plays a major role in adopting a coherent national approach. These are deployed on the ground as part of peace and stabilisation missions and bilateral projects to provide assistance with training and equipment. This opens opportunities for networking and collaboration and allows to leverage the combined expertise.
- We interact with think tanks, academic research institutes and professional organisations to further develop our technical and analytical capacity, evaluate results, and participate in international policy debates (e.g. through our cooperation with the Munich Security Conference, MSC). We also help to establish respective institutions in partner countries and support exchange and networking among these as well as with relevant stakeholders. We integrate the resulting know-how into the planning of our projects.
- We work with multilateral organisations (UN, AU, EU, etc.) to implement international and regional standards, such as the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This supports the credibility, legitimacy, and sustainability of our support.



**Principle 5: We are aware of the risks in the field of security and continually review our actions.**

- The challenges and risks relating to the field of security sector are comparable with those of other fields of activity. As the field of security also deals with the use of force, however, some of these challenges and risks are more pronounced. Political impact and perception risks arise primarily where the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force fails or where security actors do not (or no longer) contribute to human security. If the security interests of state actors' conflict with human security, this can lead to conflicting objectives with GIZ's partner-based and values-based orientation, which must be balanced in the project context.
- There is a heightened risk of unintended negative effects, especially in terms of respect for human rights. This risk increases when we cooperate with partner governments whose priority is not to protect their people but to deploy the security sector for the purpose of political repression or retaining power. Among security actors, this risk is particularly acute where professional standards and accountability and oversight mechanisms have been ineffective. Political red lines and interdependencies with GIZ's own system of norms and values must be coordinated between the commissioning party and GIZ and communicated to relevant stakeholders involved.
- GIZ's Safeguards+Gender Management System is the main instrument for assessing unintended negative results in human security. This involves an Integrated Peace and Conflict Assessment (iPCA), which takes account of the correlation between conflict, fragility, violence, and human rights violations within the context of human security. In addition, we make use of other analysis tools, such as third-party monitoring (TPM). We incorporate this information directly and continuously into our project approaches, enabling us, for example, to identify risks to the environment and climate as well as potential for promoting gender equality at an early stage and address them appropriately.
- The question of whether, with whom and how we engage in the field of security must always be answered depending on the context. When deciding whether to accept a sensitive individual commission, GIZ applies its Guidance Note for Selected Projects in the Security Sector as an instrument for internal consultation and decision-making.
- Political risks and the limits of risk assumption by GIZ are communicated to the commissioning party at an early stage. This applies, for example, to the use of supplied dual-use goods and police or military equipment. We reject the procurement of weapons and do not accept any such commissions.
- In the event of a significant deterioration in the technical and political framework conditions, a flexible realignment or exit strategy is included in the project design and coordinated with the commissioning party. In regional multi-level approaches, country components can be scaled back, and project resources shifted to other partner countries.
- GIZ's involvement in the security sector may put our staff at a heightened security risk. This is the case where we work directly with security actors, for example on infrastructure measures for partner militaries. GIZ's Corporate Security Division is involved on a continuous basis in dealing with personnel risks.



**Principle 6: We leverage our profile and unique selling points as a civilian advisor and implementer in the field of sector.**

- Due to its approaches to technical cooperation and principles, GIZ offers added value in the field of security that cannot be offered in this form by other implementing organisations in the field of security, especially ‘traditional’ military, and police advisors. The commissioning of GIZ as a German and European brand can – where desired – be made visible and thus send a political signal. GIZ’s core fields of expertise and comparative strengths include the following:
  - Interdisciplinarity and intersectorality: In the field of security, challenges at the level of foreign, security, domestic, geopolitical and development policy are increasingly interwoven. GIZ offers integrated solutions for complex challenges in areas that are particularly sensitive in political terms and addresses interfaces relevant for security, including with other GIZ fields of activity.
  - GIZ manages large consortia and combines its own core competence with complementary external expertise in the field of security. Our management skills allow us to bring together the different rationales of different implementation partners and to implement them using modular implementation approaches (global, regional, national, local), while remaining capable of acting even in critical contexts.
  - Our long-standing presence on the ground creates access to relevant actors and enables us to play a role as mediator and honest broker between the various actors from the security sector and the population or civil society.
- As a civilian actor, GIZ on specific occasions needs specialized expertise to implement measures in the security field. To this end, we enter new partnerships and cooperation arrangements with relevant service providers in a goal-oriented manner, thus ensuring quality in implementation.
- In response to the changing political environment, developments on the market and the requirements of our commissioning parties we need to further strengthen our ability to adapt. This enables us to take appropriate account of dynamics and to respond flexibly, quickly and in a customer-oriented manner to the needs and requirements of our commissioning parties in the field of security.

# Imprint

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